ABSTRACT Cloudlet is a new paradigm in mobile cloud computing to provide resources to nearby mobile users via one-hop wireless connections. In this paper, we leverage the social tie structure among mobile users to achieve mutually beneficial computation offloading decision making, and hence, enhance the system-wide performance. Drawing on a social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework, we cast users' decision making of whether to offload or not as a Socially aware computation offloading game (COG). We study the SGUM-based COG for both strong and weak information cases. For the strong information case, where each user has the knowledge of other users' actions and the perfect observation of its achieved social group utility, we show that there exists a socially aware Nash equilibrium (SNE). We then design a distributed algorithm to achieve the SNE and quantify its performance gap with respect to the social optimal solution. For the weak information case, where each user does not have the knowledge of other users' actions and observes a noise-corrupted social group utility, we develop a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm, which is shown to converge almost surely to an -SNE. The numerical results show that the computation offloading performance can be significantly enhanced by leveraging the social ties among the users.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the widespread of mobile devices and wireless communications, the demand to run applications with high computation is growing grandly. However, mobile devices are in general resource-constrained and have limited battery lifetime. To extend the battery lifetime and augment the capabilities of mobile devices, a natural solution is mobile cloud computing [1] , [2] , such that mobile device users can offload the computationally expensive tasks to the resource-rich cloud infrastructure, such as Amazon's EC2 or Rackspace. However, these clouds are typically far from the mobile users, and the network delay could be costly.
Recently, cloudlet has been proposed as a supplement to the remote cloud for computation offloading [3] , [4] . Cloudlet is typically collocated with an access point in a network (e.g., in an office building or library), and is accessible by nearby users via one-hop wireless connection. Despite its physical closeness to the mobile users, cloudlet faces the drawback of limited resources. Therefore, in the scenario of offloading tasks to the cloudlet, there exists competition among multiple mobile users over both the wireless communication resources and limited computation resources in the cloudlet. How to design a time and energy efficient computation offloading mechanism is one of the main challenge in the context of cloudlet.
Many works [5] - [11] have studied the computation offloading mechanism design for mobile cloud computing. They mainly focus on the case that each mobile user is self-interested and aims to maximize its own utility. Obviously, since mobile devices are carried and operated by human beings, the performance of computation offloading mechanism hinges heavily on human behavior. During the past few years, the online social networks have experienced explosive growth, and social relationships play an increasingly important role in people's interactions with each other. Due to the existence of social relationships, it is natural that user cares about the welfare of its social neighbors (including family and colleagues, etc.) and would take into account the effect of its decision on its social friends' welfare. This motivates us to exploit the social ties (social relationships) among mobile users to achieve mutually-beneficial computation offloading decision making and hence enhance the system-wide performance. FIGURE 1. Illustration of social group utility maximization framework for the scenario of mobile cloud computing. In the physical domain, multiple mobile devices are associated with the same wireless access point and cloudlet, and thus physically coupled with each other. In the social domain, mobile users have diverse social relationships with the others.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , in this paper, we consider a wireless network consisting of a set of mobile device users who are collocated around a cloudlet. Each user has a computationally intensive task to be completed and needs to decide whether to execute its task locally on its own mobile device or in the nearby cloudlet. Inspired by the social group utility maximization (SGUM) framework recently developed in [12] , we cast mobile users' decision making problem as a sociallyaware computation offloading game (COG). In the SGUMbased COG, each mobile user aims to maximize its social group utility, which is the sum of its individual utility and the weighted sum of its social friends' individual utilities.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1. We exploit the social tie structure among mobile users and cast mobile users' decision making of whether to offload the computations to the cloudlet as a distributed SGUM-based COG. We consider both the strong information case where each user has knowledge of other users' actions and perfect observation of its achieved social group utility, and the weak information case where each user does not have knowledge of other users' actions and observes a noise-corrupted social group utility. 2. For the SGUM-based COG with strong information, we prove the existence of SNE, and design a distributed computation offloading algorithm to achieve the desired SNE. We also derive the upper-bound of the performance gap between the SNE and the social optimal solution. 3. For the SGUM-based COG with weak information, we develop a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm which is shown to converge almost surely to an -SNE. We show that each user at the -SNE achieves the maximum expected social group utility approximately. Numerical results validate the efficacy of the proposed mechanisms and demonstrate that the performance can be significantly improved by exploiting the social ties. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the related works in Section II, we introduce the system model and problem statement in Section III. We study the SGUM-based COG with strong information and weak information in Section IV and Section V, respectively. The numerical results are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK A. MOBILE CLOUD COMPUTING
The exploitation of cloud resources for augmenting mobile devices has bred a new research area called mobile cloud computing.
Most of the research on mobile cloud computing focus on using the remote resource-rich cloud infrastructure [13] to enhance the capabilities of mobile devices [5] - [10] . In [5] , a dynamic offloading algorithm was proposed to help the mobile device users to determine which software components to execute remotely given the availability of wireless network. Barbera et al. [6] provided a precise evaluation of bandwidth and energy cost of mobile cloud computing. Zhang et al. [7] investigated the minimum-energy task scheduling problem and proposed an efficient algorithm for Markovian chain model. Barbarossa et al. [8] proposed a method to jointly optimize the allocation of communication and computation resources. Chen et al. [9] , [10] designed a decentralized mechanism for the computation offloading decision making problem among multiple mobile users.
Recently, cloudlet has been proposed as a supplement to the remote cloud for computation offloading [3] , [4] , which can provide available resources to nearby mobile devices with lower network delay and energy consumption.
Wu and Ying [14] proposed a cloudlet-based multi-lateral resource exchange framework for mobile users without relying a central entity. Jia et al. [15] studied the problem of cloudlet placement and mobile user allocation to the cloudlets in a wireless metropolitan area network. Different from the deployment problem in wireless sensor network [16] , [17] , the placement problem in cloudlet system not only consider the coverage problem, but also should balance the mobile users' workload. In [18] , a context-aware offloading algorithm was proposed to select the potential cloud resources as the offloading location for the system consisting of multiple VOLUME 4, 2016 cloud resources such as mobile ad-hoc cloud, cloudlet and remote public clouds. Jin et al. [19] developed a truthful auction mechanism for resource sharing between mobile devices as buyers and cloudlets as sellers.
B. SOCIALLY-AWARE MOBILE NETWORKING
For mobile networking, exploiting the social relationship of mobile users emerges as a new topic for network design and optimization [12] , [20] - [23] . Costa et al. [20] proposed a routing framework for publish-subscribe by exploiting the predictions based on metrics of social interactions. Recently, a social group utility maximization framework was developed in [12] , which captures the impact of users' diverse social ties on their interactions with others. Based on the SGUM framework, Gong et al. [21] leveraged the social ties among users to enhance personalized location privacy in mobile networks and Zhang et al. [22] proposed a privacy-preserving database assisted spectrum access scheme. Cao et al. [23] designed a social-aware video multicast system leveraging device-to-device communications.
For the scenario of mobile cloud computing, some works propose to exploit the friend relationships in social network to form a ''Social Cloud'' [24] , [25] , where the users can share their resources with each other in a peer-to-peer manner with the help of a centralized entity. Different from [24] , [25] , we consider the computation offloading mechanism design in a cloudlet system. By leveraging the diverse social tie structure among mobile users, we aim to achieve mutually-beneficial computation offloading decision making and hence enhance the system-wide performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that studies socially-aware computation offloading problem in cloudlet system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a set of N = {1, 2, . . . , N } mobile device users, collocated around a single cloudlet. For example, the cloudlet is deployed in an office by the company to facilitate the intensive computation for its employees. Each user in N has a computationally intensive task to be completed, and needs to decide whether the task should be executed locally on its own mobile device or in the nearby cloudlet. Let a n ∈ {0, 1} denote the computation offloading decision of user n. We have that a n = 1 if user n decides to execute its task in the cloudlet, and a n = 0 if user n chooses to compute its task locally. Similar to many previous studies in mobile cloud computing [5] - [11] , to enable tractable analysis and get useful insights, we consider a quasi-static scenario where the set of mobile device users N remains unchanged during a computation offloading period, while may change over consecutive periods.
The computation task of mobile device user n is characterized by T n (A n , B n ), where A n denotes the size of computation input data (e.g., the program codes) and B n denotes the total number of instructions required to accomplish T n . Let S l n and S c be the speeds (i.e., instructions per second) of mobile device user n and the cloudlet, respectively.
The mobile users share an access point communication channel which is used for task uploading. To avoid the transmission collision [26] , we assume that the access point scheduler partitions the time resources into multiple small timeslots and dynamically allocates these timeslots among all the users with computation offloading in a round robin fashion [10] , [27] . Then user n's expected throughput for computation offloading can be written as
where a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ) is the decision profile of all users, and R n is the uplink data rate of user n when the user is scheduled for data transmission. Accordingly, the total time required for completing user n's transmission can be written as
Similarly, to ensure fairness, we assume that the cloudlet will equally divide the total computation resources among the offloading users, and then the time required for cloudlet processing of user n is given by
Let T l n = B n S l n denote the execution time of task T n by local computing. The total consumed energy E l n by local computing can be written as
where P c n is the user n's power consumption for computing. If mobile device user n chooses to execute its task in the cloudlet, the total consumed energy can be written as
where the first part is the consumed energy for transmission, the second part is the consumed energy for being idle, P tr n is user n's transmit power, P id n is user n's power consumption while being idle, According to (2)- (5), we next compute the overhead of local and cloudlet computing in terms of processing time and energy. The overhead of local computing can be written as
where θ t n , θ e n ∈ [0, 1] denote the weights of processing time and energy for user n's decision making, respectively. If user n is sensitive to the delay, then it would set a higher value to θ t n , such as θ t n = 1 and θ e n = 0. If user n has low battery and is concern about the energy consumption, then it can set θ t n = 0 and θ e n = 1. The overhead of cloudlet computing can be written as
Let K n (θ t n + θ e n P id n )(
Based on the weighted time and energy overhead in (6) and (8), we define the normalized utility of user n as
, if a n = 1.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Social relationships play an increasingly important role in people's interactions with each other. Due to the existence of social relationship, a user not only cares about its own welfare but also the welfare of other users having social ties with it. This motivates us to exploit the social ties among users to achieve mutually-beneficial computation offloading decision making. Appealing to the SGUM framework developed in [12] , we model the social tie structure among the mobile device users in N by a social graph (N , E S ). The vertex set is the same as the users N and the edge set is given as E S = {(n, m) : e S nm = 1, ∀n, m ∈ N }, where e S nm = 1 if user n and m have social tie between each other. Let s nm denote the strength of social tie between user n and user m, which is normalized to be s nm ∈ (0, 1], with a higher value of s nm being a stronger social tie. We assume that each user n's social tie to itself is s nn = 1. The social tie s nm quantifies the extent to which user n cares about user m relative to user n cares about itself. We define user n's social group N S n as the set of users that user n has social ties with, i.e., N S n {m ∈ N |e S nm ∈ E S }. Note that, prior to the computation offloading process, users can identify the social relationships among them by locally carrying out the identification process through the proximity communications (e.g., using Bluetooth/ WiFi-Direct/Device-To-Device communications [28] ). Two users can detect their social relationship by carrying out the matching process to identify the common social features among them in a privacy-preserving manner by using the approach in [29] .
Based on the social graph model above, users are coupled in the social domain due to the social ties among them, and user n aims to choose a n ∈ {0, 1} to maximize its social group utility, defined as (9) where a −n is the decision profile of all the users except user n. The social group utility function captures the feature that each user is socially-aware and cares about the utilities of the other users with social ties with it.
IV. SGUM BASED COMPUTATION OFFLOADING GAME WITH STRONG INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the SGUM based computation offloading mechanism design with strong information. For this case, each user n has knowledge of other users' actions as well as the perfect observation of its achieved social group utility.
A. SGUM-BASED COG
We next consider the distributed decision making problem among the mobile device users for maximizing their social group utilities. We adopt a game theoretic approach to study this problem. Game theory is a powerful tool for designing distributed mechanisms, such that the mobile device users in the system can locally make decisions based on strategic interactions. Specifically, we formulate the socially-aware computation offloading decision making problem as a strategic game
, where the set of users N is the set of players, A n {0, 1} is the action space of player n, and the social group utility function L n of user n is the payoff function of player n. In the sequel, we call the game as the SGUM-based COG. We next introduce the concept of socially-aware Nash equilibrium (SNE 
Due to the rational and autonomous nature of mobile device users, a SNE is a stable outcome such that all the users can achieve a mutually satisfactory solution and no user has the incentive to deviate at the equilibrium.
B. EXISTENCE OF SNE
To establish the existence of SNE in the SGUM-based COG, we first introduce the concept of potential game [30] .
Definition 2 (Potential Game): A game is called an exact potential game if it admits a potential function (a)
such that for every n ∈ N , a −n ∈ m =n A m , and for any a n , a n ∈ A n , L n (a n , a −n ) − L n (a n , a −n ) = (a n , a −n ) − (a n , a −n ).
(10) A nice property of a potential game is that it always admits a Nash equilibrium and any strategy profile that maximizes the potential function is a Nash equilibrium. We next show that the SGUM-based COG is a potential game.
Theorem 1: The SGUM-based COG is an exact potential game with the potential function given as VOLUME 4, 2016 follows:
where I {E} is the indicator function with I {E} = 1 if the event E is true and I {E} = 0 otherwise. Proof: Please see Appendix A. The result in Theorem 1 implies that any strategy profile that maximizes the potential function in (11) is a SNE. This motivates the algorithm design for computing the SNE of SGUM-based COG in the following section.
C. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING SNE
In this section, we propose a distributed computation offloading algorithm to achieve a desired SNE.
Algorithm 1 Distributed Computation Offloading Algorithm for SGUM-Based Computation Offloading With Strong
Information initialization: Set the exploration parameter β and decision update rates τ n s. Each user n ∈ N randomly chooses the initial decision from A n = {0, 1}. loop for each mobile device user n ∈ N in parallel 1. User n computes the social group utility L n (a n , a −n ) on the current decision a n . 2. User n independently generates a random number following the exponential distribution with mean 1 τ n and counts down according to this number. 3. When the count down expires, user n chooses a different decision a n from the strategy set A n and computes the social group utility L n (a n , a −n ). 4. If L n (a n , a −n ) ≥ L n (a n , a −n ), user n chooses a n as the updated decision; Otherwise, chooses a n with a probability of exp(βL n (a n ,a −n )) exp(βL n (a n ,a −n )) , and sticks to the current decision a n with a probability of 1 − exp(βL n (a n ,a −n )) exp(βL n (a n ,a −n )) .
end loop
Since any computation offloading decision profile a that maximizes the potential function (a) is a SNE, we next design a distributed computation offloading algorithm to compute the SNE of SGUM-based COG by maximizing (a). The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1, which is based on Markov approximation approach. The key idea is to design a Markov chain with the state space being N n=1 A n and the stationary distribution p a being
where β is the exploration parameter.
Initially, each mobile device user randomly chooses a decision from A n . To achieve the asynchronous decision update, each user n updates its computation offloading decision according to a timer value that follows the exponential distribution with a rate of τ n . When user n's count-down expires, it chooses the decision a n different from its current one a n . Then user n computes the social group utility L n (a n , a −n ) under the decision profile (a n , a −n ). To compute the social group utility, user n needs to communicate with the users having social ties with it to enquire about their individual utilities. If L n (a n , a −n ) ≥ L n (a n , a −n ), user n chooses a n as its updated decision. If L n (a n , a −n ) < L n (a n , a −n ), user n will changes its decision from a n to a n with a probability of exp(βL n (a n , a −n )) exp(βL n (a n , a −n )) .
Note that when L n (a n , a −n ) < L n (a n , a −n ), user n still chooses a n with a probability as given in (13) . With such probabilistic computation offloading decision updates, all the mobile device users can explore the feasible decision space. With larger β, users are more likely to explore.
For the property of the achieved computation offloading Markov chain, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The distributed computation offloading algorithm (Algorithm 1) realizes a time reversible Markov chain with unique stationary distribution shown in (12).
Proof: Please see Appendix B. When β → ∞, the optimal strategy profile that maximizes (a) will be selected with probability one.
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM 1
In the subsection, we analyze the performance of the SNE computed by Algorithm 1 when β is sufficiently large. From the system-wide perspective, a natural objective is to maximize the social welfare of the system, which is the total individual utility received by all users, i.e., V (a) = n∈N U n (a). Let a o denote the social optimal solution that maximizes the social welfare, i.e., a o = argmax a∈ V (a). Let a * denote the SNE achieved by the Algorithm 1, i.e., a * = argmax a∈ (a). Proof: Please see Appendix C. According to Theorem 2, we observe that the upper-bound of the performance gap decreases as the strength of social tie increases. In particular, when users are socially-oblivious, i.e., s nm = 0, ∀e S nm ∈ E S , the performance gap reaches the maximum 1 2 N (N − 1) ; when users are fully altruistic (s nm = 1 for all n, m ∈ N ), the performance gap is zero, and the SNE for SGUM-based COG corresponds to the social optimal solution.
V. SGUM BASED COMPUTATION OFFLOADING GAME WITH WEAK INFORMATION
In this section, we consider the SGUM based computation offloading mechanism design for the case with weak information, where user n does not have knowledge of other users' actions and observes a noise-corrupted social group utility. The noisy L n is due to that other users (∀m ∈ N S n ) may perturb the U m s and report to user n the noise-added utilitiesŨ m s for privacy concern. Thus, user n's observationL n of its social group utility L n can be modeled as
where l is a random variable with mean zero.
Due to the noisy observed social group utility and the lack of knowledge of others' actions, it makes sense for each user n to target on maximizing its expected social group utility over a mixed strategy space A n , where each element π n = (q n,0 , q n,1 ) ∈ A n is a probability distribution over A n with q n,a n denoting the probability of user n choosing a n . Then the joint mixed strategy over all users is π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π N ) ∈ A, where A N n=1 A n . Let π −n denote the joint mixed strategy profile of all users except user n. It then follows that the expected social group utility S n (π n , π −n ) of user n can be written as
A. -SNE For the SGUM based computation offloading mechanism design with weak information, we adopt the notion of -SNE as a desirable solution. At a given -SNE, no one of the users can increase its expected social group utility by more than by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. Before providing a formal definition of -SNE, we introduce the notion of smooth best response.
Definition 3 (Smooth Best Response):
For each user n with payoff S n (π n , π −n ), given the other users' joint mixed strategy π −n , the smooth best response b n (π −n ) ∈ A n is defined as
where γ > 0 is the temperature parameter and the smooth function v n (π n ) is concave and strictly differentiable such that the slope of v n becomes infinite as π n approaches the boundary of A n . Note that when γ → 0, the b n (π −n ) is the uniform probability distribution independently of the strategies adopted by all the other users, whereas when γ → ∞, it boils down to the standard best response. For a finite γ > 0, the b n (π −n ) is a probability distribution that assigns a higher probability to the action with larger expected social group utility.
In this paper, we adopt the commonly used smooth function expressed as v n (π n ) = − a n ∈A n q n,a n ln(q n,a n ).
With (15), the smooth best response in (14) can be expressed in the form of Boltzmann distribution: b n (a n ; π −n ) = exp(γ S n (a n , π −n )) a n ∈A n exp(γ S n (a n , π −n )) .
Based on the definition of SNE and smooth best response, we next introduce the concept of -SNE.
Definition 4 ( -SNE):
A joint mixed strategy π * = (π * 1 , π * 2 , . . . , π * N ) ∈ A is an -SNE of the SGUM-based COG , if for each user n ∈ N , given other users' joint mixed strategy profile π −n ,
At -SNE, the increased payoff of each user by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium is bounded by (γ ).
B. DISTRIBUTED REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm for socially-aware computation offloading for the case with weak information. In this case, each user can not directly observe other users' exact actions, and thus it is unable to build its smooth best response. Moreover, the noise-corrupted social group utility poses another challenge to our computation offloading algorithm design. In what follows, we develop a distributed algorithm which consists of two coupled reinforcement learning processes running in parallel, as shown in Algorithm 2. The first reinforcement learning process allows user n to build an estimate of its expected social group utility using noisy observationL n . Let S n = Ŝ n (0),Ŝ n (1) denote the estimation vector of the expected social group utility of user n. The second reinforcement learning process then uses the vector of estimatesŜ n (π −n ) to update its strategy by making smooth best response. The detail of the two reinforcement learning process is given as follows:
1) EXPECTED SOCIAL GROUP UTILITY LEARNING
In the first learning process, each user n learns its expected social group utility. The learning process can be written as follows:
where a t n is the action chosen by user n at iteration t and µ t > 0 is the learning rate of the first learning process satisfying lim t→∞ t≥0
L t n (a t n ) is obtained by querying the utilities U t m s of its social friends in N S n . It is well known that in the singleagent reinforcement learning, provided each action is chosen infinitely often, the estimated values will converge almost surely to the expected payoffs E[L n ]. However, in the multiagent learning, the standard result no longer apply.
2) COMPUTATION OFFLOADING STRATEGY UPDATE
In the second learning process, each user n updates its strategy based on smooth best response using the values ofŜ t n s learned in the first learning process. Similar to Algorithm 1, each user n updates its strategy after waiting for a back-off time that follows the exponential distribution with rate τ n . Based on (16), the smooth best response of user n at iteration t can be written as b t n (a n ;Ŝ n ) = exp(γŜ n (a n )) a n ∈A n exp(γŜ n (a n ))
, ∀a n ∈ A n . (20) With (20), user n updates its mixed strategy π t n at iteration t. Specifically, the probability q t n,a n of choosing a n ∈ A n is updated as follows:
where λ t > 0 is the learning rate of the second learning process which satisfying lim t→∞ t≥0
Note that the parameters µ t and λ t determine the timescale of the first and second learning processes, respectively. Besides the conditions (19) and (22), we choose µ t and λ t such that
The requirement (23) ensures that the first learning process is proceeded in a faster time scale than the second learning process, and thus we can analyze the asymptotic behavior of the algorithm as if the fast learning process is always fully ''calibrated'' to the current value of the slow process.
C. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS OF ALGORITHM 2
We now analyze the convergence of the proposed Algorithm 2, which is essentially a coupled two time-scale stochastic approximation process. From (23), we have that the strategies change on a slower time scale than the time scale on which expected social group utilities are learned. Thus the first learning process would consider the iteration of q t n,a n as a time-invariant process, and the second learning process would consider the iteration ofŜ t n (a n ) as always calibrated to the current value of q n,a n . Using [31, Th. 5], we present the convergence behavior of Algorithm 2 in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Algorithm 2 converges almost surely to an -SNE in the game . In particular, the following Algorithm 2 Distributed Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for SGUM Based Computation Offloading With Weak Information initialization: Set the temperature parameter γ and strategy update rates τ n s. Each user n ∈ N randomly chooses an initial decision from A n and initialize the vectorsŜ 0 n and π 0 n . loop for each mobile device user n ∈ N in parallel 1. User n independently generates a random number following the exponential distribution with mean 1 τ n and counts down according to this number.
Expected social group utility learning:
(1) Compute the instantaneous social group utilitỹ L n (a t n ). (2) Update the estimation of expected social group utilitŷ S t n (a n ) based on (18).
Computation offloading strategy update:
(1) When the count down expires, user n computes the smooth best response b t n (a n ;Ŝ n ) according to (20) using the estimationŜ n . (2) Update the mixed strategy π t n based on (21) and choose an action according to π t n . end loop holds ∀n ∈ N and ∀a n ∈ A n :
n (a n ) = S n (a n , π * −n ). Proof: Please see Appendix D. We next explore the property of the achieved -SNE of Algorithm 2, which is given as follows.
Theorem 4: For each user n ∈ N , the computation offloading strategy at the -SNE maximizes its expected social group utility approximately. Specifically, we have that
Proof: Please see Appendix E. Theorem 4 indicates that the performance gap between the -SNE and the maximum of expected social group utility is upper-bounded and the gap can be reduced to arbitrarily small by increasing γ .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the system efficiency of our proposed algorithms. We consider the scenario that N mobile device users are randomly scattered over a 100m×100m square area and the cloudlet is located at the center of the area. The channel bandwidth and background noise are set as W = 5 MHz and w n = −60 dBm, respectively. The channel gain is expressed as H na = d −α na , where d na is the distance between user n and the access point and α = 4 is the path loss factor. We assume that all the users are allocated with the same transmit power with P tr n = 1.5 Watts. P c n and P id n are uniformly generated in the intervals [0.5, 1] and [0.2, 0.5] Watts, respectively. The data size for computation offloading is A n = 420 KB and the total number of instructions needed is B n = 1000 × 10 6 [9] . The speed of user n (S l n ) is uniformly generated in the interval [100, 200] , and the speed of the cloudlet (S c ) is set as 6 × 10 3 instructions per second. The exploration parameter is β = 10. For the case with weak information, the additive noise on the instantaneous payoff follows normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1.
To investigate the impact of social relationships, we simulate the social graph based on the Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph model [12] , [21] , where a social edge exists between any two users with probability P s . We assume that the strength of social tie is s nm = 1 if it exists. Larger P s means more dense social links among the users.
To benchmark the performance achieved by our proposed algorithms, we implement the socially-oblivious and social optimal solutions. In socially-oblivious solution, each user maximizes its individual utility. The social optimal solution is found by exhaustive search. The social welfare of our algorithms and the optimal social welfare are normalized with respect to that of socially-oblivious solution. We illustrate the impact of P s and N on the normalized social welfare and set the default values of parameters as P s = 0.5, N = 20, and θ t n = θ e n = 0.5. For each parameter setting, we average the results over 1000 runs. We first show the impact of P s and N on the number of offloading users of our socially-aware solutions in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. Fig. 2 illustrates the average number of offloading users with different P s in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. We can see that more users choose local computing as P s increases. With larger P s , more users care about the welfare of others. Since choosing to offload would increase other offloading users' time and energy overhead, more socially-aware users choose local computing as P s increases. From Fig. 3 , we see that the number of offloading users increases as N increases. With strong information, more users choose local computing in order to reduce the competition on the wireless communication and cloudlet Next we compare the social welfare achieved by our socially-aware solutions with respect to that of socially-oblivious solution and social optimum, as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . We observe from these figures that socially-aware users significantly outperforms sociallyoblivious users. From Fig. 4 , as P s increases, we see that the performance of socially-aware users improves for both cases with strong information and weak information, and the performance gap between the two cases decrease gradually. For the case with strong information, the normalized social welfare of Algorithm 1 approaches to the social optimum when P s = 1, with a performance gain up to 61% over socially-oblivious users when θ t n = 1 and θ e n = 0, and a performance gain up to 88% when θ t n = 0 and θ e n = 1. For the case with weak information, the normalized social welfare of VOLUME 4, 2016 Algorithm 2 has a performance gain up to 42% over sociallyoblivious users when θ t n = 1 and θ e n = 0, and a performance gain up to 60% when θ t n = 0 and θ e n = 1. With larger P s , there exist more social ties among the N users, and thus the strength of cooperation among users becomes stronger. Fig. 5 demonstrates the impact of number of users on the achieved social welfare of the algorithms. We observe that the performance gap from socially-oblivious users to socially-aware users and the social optimal solution decrease as N increases. This is because with a larger number of users, the competition for cloudlet computing would increase and thus more users would choose local computing even when they are socially-oblivious. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 verify the effectiveness of exploiting social ties to stimulate the cooperation among users for achieving efficient computation offloading mechanism.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a socially-aware computation offloading mechanism design in cloudlet system, based on a social group utility maximization framework that captures diverse social ties among multiple mobile device users. For the strong information case, we model the interactions among the users as a SGUM-based COG and proved the existence of SNE. We then designed a distributed computation offloading algorithm to achieve the SNE of the SGUM-based COG and derived the performance gap between the computed SNE and the social optimal solution. For the weak information case, we developed a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm which is shown to converge almost surely to a -SNE. Numerical results demonstrated that the proposed mechanisms are efficient and the performance can be improved by exploiting the social ties.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on (6) -(9), we have that
where X n
Based on (11), (1, a −n ) and (0, a −n ) can be written as follows respectively,
With (25) and (26), we have that
Combining (24) and (27) , we obtain that
Therefore, we have that the SGUM-based COG game is a potential game.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let p a,a denote the transition rate from system state a to a . To show the Markov chain is time reversible, we need to verify that the distribution (12) satisfies the following balanced equations p a p a,a = p a p a ,a , ∀a, a ∈ .
Note that the only nontrivial case is where a and a differ by exactly one user. Based on user n's computation offloading decision update, the probability of transition from system state (a n , a −n ) to (a n , a −n ) is given by g a,a 1 2 exp(βL n (a n , a −n )) max exp(βL n (a n , a −n )), exp(βL n (a n , a −n )) ,
where a = (a n , a −n ), a = (a n , a −n ), and 1 2 is due to the fact that |A n | = 2 in the SGUM-based COG.
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Since each user n activates its decision update based on the countdown timer mechanism with rate τ n , it follows that
exp(βL n (a n )) max exp(βL n (a n )), exp(βL n (a n ))
.
Letting
( a ∈ exp(β (a )))(max exp(βL n (a n )), exp(βL n (a n )) ) ,
we have that
Similarly, we also have that
Therefore, the computation offloading Markov chain is time reversible and its unique stationary distribution is indeed (12) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first show V (a)'s expression in terms of (a). Based on (11), we have that
We then have that
where the first inequality is due to the fact that (a o ) ≤ (a * ), and the second inequality is due to the fact that s nm ≤ 1 and (I {a e n =1} I {a e m =1} − I {a o n =1} I {a o m =1} ) ≤ 1.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The first learning process (18) and second learning process (21) can be rewritten as follows respectively:
and q t n,a n = q t−1 n,a n 
and
n,a n − q t−1 n,a n λ t |Ŝ t n , q t n,a n .
Based on the requirements (19) and (22), we have that the sequences { Based on the ordinary differential equation (ODE) approach, the processes (31) and (32) can be treated as noisy discretisation of the continuous determined ODEs as follows:
n (a n ), q t−1 n,a n ) (35a) q n,a n = F q n,an (Ŝ t−1 n (a n ), q t−1 n,a n )
In our case, (35a) can be explicitly written aṡ S n (a n ) = q n,a n S n (a n , π −n ) −Ŝ n (a n ) , which has a globally asymptotically stable fixed point for a fixed π so long as no action a n has zero probability of being chosen. Thereby with (23), we next only need to analyze the convergence of the second learning process (32) . The limiting behavior of (32) is directly related to the asymptotic behavior of trajectories of the ODE (35b) which describes a smooth best response dynamic:
q n,a n = b n (π −n ) − q n,a n .
Based on Theorem 1, we have that our game is an exact potential game for which a Lyapunov function exists [32] . It then follows directly the global convergence of the trajectories given by (36), thereby establishing the convergence of Algorithm 2. Since the convergence point must be a zero point of the associated ODEs (35a), we have that π n = b n (π −n ), which shows that the convergence point is an -SNE of the game .
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APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Based on the properties of the smooth function v n (π n ) = − a n ∈A n q n,a n ln(q n,a n ), we have that max π n ∈ A n S n (π n , π * −n ) ≤ max π n ∈ A n S n (π n , π * −n ) + v n (π n ) ≤ S n (π * n , π * −n ) + max   − 1 γ a n ∈A n q n,a n ln(q n,a n ) 
